In recent years, Ukrainian society has developed a negative attitude towards the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as confirmed by various sociological surveys. An alternative to such surveys, which tend to show the superficial attitude of ordinary citizens towards religion, is the report “War and Religion: Views from within Ukraine’s ‘Russian’ Church”. It was prepared by Andriy Fert as part of a project by the German Centre for Eastern European and International Studies (ZOIS).
The report is based on twenty-seven interviews with priests and laypeople from nine parishes located in cities and villages across Ukraine. Its main advantage is that it provides an opportunity to view the situation through the eyes of the faithful and clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Below we present the main points of this report.
- Lack of decisive action following the council in Theophania in May 2022. Some respondents insist that the council’s decisions were insufficient, pointing to the sporadic commemoration of the Moscow Patriarch and the failure to implement the separation from the Russian Orthodox Church. Denying this connection requires a clear positive alternative: if we are not a part of the Moscow Patriarchate, then who are we?
- General lack of communication with the secular community. Although most respondents blame the media for their one-sided coverage of the situation, some respondents acknowledge that the Church has not done enough in terms of communication and self-purification. A number of priests spoke of the need to “send some talkative head to television to tell them […] that we are not their enemies, that we are Ukrainians, that we love our people and pray for our army and victory”.
- Fear of radical changes in identity, which may be perceived as external conformism capable of destroying the legitimacy of the ecclesiastical-mystical tradition. Many respondents express the view that the Church is called upon to preserve its natural tradition and mystical continuity. Religiously, they rely on the thesis: “The Church is eternal because it does not adapt to party lines. Party lines change, but the Church does not. This has been the case for two thousand years”.
- The dominant image of the UOC as an exclusively pro-Russian structure is simplistic. This image is insufficient for understanding the internal diversity and complexity of the situation within this church community. In fact, conversations with believers and clergy reveal a wide range of views on the war, the coexistence of two Orthodox jurisdictions, and the need for change within the UOC.
- A distorted interpretation of the refusal to switch to the Ukrainian language in church services and to transfer parishes to the OCU. In reality, the language of worship is more a matter of habit, a certain mysticism, and historical continuity. Similarly, the refusal to transfer to the OCU is explained mainly not by political, but by ecclesiological and spiritual-moral considerations.
- Church and religious life today is a coexistence of two parallel worlds – the mystical-liturgical and the historical-political. Believers and clergy of the UOC strive to keep their church out of politics, but the war and the political context draw the church community into the field of acute secular discourse. Therefore, the conflict between religious communities that strive to be apolitical and the increasingly politicised society is likely to continue.
- Overall, the UOC is at a historic turning point. The UOC is currently experiencing a historic crisis. It is a crisis of legitimacy and unity that is tearing the church community apart from within and exposing it to external pressure.
You can read more about the analysis of the report “War and Religion: Views from within the Ukraine’s ‘Russian’ Church” on our website – https://www.academic-initiative.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ZOIS_Report.pdf (in Ukrainian)
