In this article, I analyze official statistics regarding religious communities and church buildings of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and changes in these statistics over the past two years. A similar analysis was prepared in 2021, before the start of a large-scale war in Ukraine. In that time I wrote two articles, based on the analysis of the statistics of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (SSEFC). Their titles were “The Struggle for Recognition: How has the relationship between both leading Orthodox denominations of Ukraine changed since the Tomos of the OCU was granted?” (in Ukrainian – (https://www.academic-initiative.org.ua/2021/06/27/shchodo_statystyky_upts-ptsu/) and “Is the ‘Orthodox Church of Ukraine’ mainly a church of Galicia? Witness of the state statistics” (both in Ukrainian and English – https://www.academic-initiative.org.ua/en/2021/06/27/ocu_mainly_a_church_of_galitia/).
If in 2018-2021 an important factor for the dynamics of change was the granting of the Tomos to the local church of Ukraine, now a large-scale war has become a decisive factor. This time I compared the statistics of 2021 with the statistics of 2023 (for 2022, in seven regions, official statistics from SSEFC was simply absent). From the available data, it is obvious that significant changes took place precisely in 2023, that is, the war itself became a significant factor in changing the situation.
An important aspect for reducing the possibilities of analyzing statistical data was the refusal of SSEFC for 2023 to keep statistics of clergymen – until 2022, this was a significant auxiliary and corrective factor in clarifying the general situation, because a parish without a priest is a certain nonsense for the liturgical life of an orthodox community. In 2022, the number of priests and male monks was 7.933 and 3.821 respectively, in favor of the UOC, and it could not change radically over the last year.
Regarding the statistics of the dynamics of parish number by region during the war, the biggest paradox here is the difference between the situation in the Kyiv region and in the city of Kyiv. In Kyiv region, the OCU grew by 144 communities in two years, while the UOC decreased by 122 communities. At the same time, the number of OCU church buildings in the region increased by only 13, while the number of UOC churches decreased by 50. Officially, the OCU now has 637 parishes in the Kyiv region, which have a total of 455 church buildings. That means that 28.6% of its parishes do not even have an adapted room for church services. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church has 626 parishes and 707 church buildings, which should adequately meet the needs of the parishes.
The statistics of changes show that the situation in the city of Kyiv is strikingly different from the situation in the Kyiv region: here over the past two years the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has not lost any of its 319 parishes and any of its 93 church buildings. The OCU in Kyiv grew by only 8 parishes, and even lost one of its church buildings (they became 47).
These statistics indicate two points: firstly, it is likely to assume that the attitudes among orthodox believers in Kyiv and its region are quite similar, and therefore the involvement of local authorities in the issue of assisting the OCU in developing its structure is a significant factor for statistics changes. Secondly, in the city of Kyiv, it is impossible to organize a meeting of a territorial community that would vote for a change of jurisdiction, if there is no consent of the clergy of the parish. This affects the fact that the possible anti-Russian sentiments in Kyiv are practically not reflected in the statistics of changes in the ratio of the UOC and the OCU.
In addition to Kyiv region, another notable group is Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Khmelnytskyi regions. Already in the analysis of statistics for 2021, we showed that these regions differ from others in terms of greater dynamics of growth of the OCU. This trend was confirmed during the first year of the war.
The most numerous changes in the balance of OCU and UOC took place in Khmelnytskyi region – the number of OCU parishes increased by 137 (34.2%), and church buildings – by 120 (48.4%). At the same time, the corresponding figures for the decrease in the UOC are even higher – it has fewer parishes by 165 (17.4%), and church buildings by 159 (19.9%).
Probably, these figures mean the significant involvement of the local state authorities in the process of “developing a national church”, which cleans up and takes away from the UOC even in the cases where the OCU itself does not seek to take this into its hands. Nevertheless, the balance of existing parishes and church buildings in the Khmelnytskyi region remains in favor of the UOC: it has 782 parishes, which is significantly more than the 538 parishes in the OCU; the proportion of church buildings also remains in favor of the UOC: 641 to 368 in the OCU.
Similar processes, but to a less extent, also took place in the Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, and Rivne regions: the increase in the parishes of the OCU was from 10% to 17%, and the corresponding decrease in the number of parishes in the UOC was from 5% to 9%. Also, two more regions – of Cherkasy and of Chernihiv – have joined this group, which is defined by a rather active dynamic of changes, in which the process of noticeable strengthening of the quantitative presence of the OCU in relation to the UOC has become available.
Here the factor of support for creating the “national church” by the local state authorities is quite likely. Thus, in the Cherkasy region, the number of OCU parishes increased by 48, while the number of church premises increased even by 91. At the same time, this increase was only partially at the expense of the UOC – the number of church buildings here decreased by only 8.
Another group of regions that clearly stands out from the rest is Galicia. For a long time, in these three regions, the OCU clearly prevails over the UOC – in terms of the number of parishes and clergy. Here, even a small number of changes in the belonging of parishes means a significant percentage decrease in the presence of the UOC. The worst situation for the UOC is in Ivano-Frankivsk region: here, in two years, out of 33 parishes remained only 21, and out of 28 church buildings – only 24.
It is important to note that significant quantitative changes end here. The rest of Ukraine shows relative stability in terms of the number of parishes and church buildings. This concerns, first of all, the situation in 4 regions where war hostilities are taking place – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions.
One can assume that in the situation of war, both the change in the belonging of parishes and preparation of statistics regarding these processes are of here little relevance. At the same time, these are areas in which the quantitative advantage of the UOC over the OCU was and remains significant. For example, the proportion of parishes in the Zaporizhia region is 384 to 135, and the number of church buildings is 363 to 76 in favor of the UOC.
The last and largest group consists of 9 regions, in which statistical changes during the year of the war turned out to be rather insignificant. They are located in different parts of the country: western Ukraine (Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi regions), central Ukraine (Kirovohrad, Poltava, and Sumy regions) and southeastern Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv regions).
Thus, in Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Poltava, and Sumy regions, there is a certain growth of OCU parishes (6-10%), while during this time the number of UOC parishes there has not changed significantly. And in Zakarpattia, Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions, the OCU shows even a decrease in the number of its parishes or churches.
If we display the analyzed data on the map, it will appear that the issue of intense or, on the contrary, insignificant dynamics of changes in the ratio between the UOC and the OCU divides Ukraine into two parts. The dividing line runs from the northeast to the southwest, while everything to the east and south of the Chernihiv, Cherkasy, and Vinnytsia regions is of less nationalistic character, in which the UOC clearly outnumbers the OCU, and moreover, changes in religious affiliation remain minimal.
The city of Kyiv, Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi regions are added to them. The proportion of regions with positive changes for the OCU (conditional “northwest”) to those where such changes are hardly noticeable and the UOC is much stronger (conditional “south and east”) is 11 to 14 (here we do not count Crimea).
It is in the 11 regions of the “northwest” where the major growth of OCU parishes is noted – 617 out of 673. Due to this the relative parity between the number of parishes of the two Orthodox churches – OCU and UOC (respectively 5,750 and 5,332) has been achieved here. Despite the losses, in terms of the number of church buildings, the UOC is even slightly ahead: 4,857 against 4,641 in the OCU. Regarding clergy, we have statistics only for 2021, but it is obvious that even here in the last two years, the OCU did not overcome the difference of 1,200 people (it had then 3,333 clerics, while the UOC had 4,533).
Situation in another part of Ukraine – the “south and east” (which includes 13 regions and the city of Kyiv) is radically better for the UOC. Here, the increase of the OCU amounted to only 56 parishes, and at the beginning of 2023 the total number of parishes was more than three times inferior to the UOC (2,111 to 6,449, respectively). In terms of the church buildings, the UOC is here 4.8 times ahead of the OCU (having 5,915 churches against 1,239 in the OCU). Probably, the proportion of the number of clergy is approximately the same – in 2021, their number was 5,977 to 1,239 respectively.
It is reasonable to assume that the desire of the central government to support the growth of the “national church” is the same for all regions of the country. From this it follows that real regional differences in Ukraine are so strong that in most parts of the country this idea is perceived rather coldly, and its implementation is likely to be sabotaged by local authorities. The state manages to change the situation mainly there where anti-Russian sentiment is stronger – in western and partly central Ukraine (“northwest” in our terminology).
We can assume that this disproportion in the development of the balance between the UOC and the OCU became a reason for changing the head of the SSEFC at the end of 2022. It is still too early to talk about changes in the statistics of parishes and church buildings during 2023, but the general impression from the news is that local authorities in various regions try to make more efforts to facilitate the transition of UOC parishes to the OCU.
At the same time, two points should be noted: there have already been several statements by the head of the OCU, Metropolitan Epiphanius, about his unwillingness to accept parishes from the UOC, if they actually transfer under coercion, without changing their conditional pro-Russian mentality. The second factor is the repeated statements of the head of the SSEFC, Viktor Yelenskyi, about the illegality of the actions of local councils, which prohibit the activities of UOC communities on their territory.
In fact, the available statistics reflect the principle “cuius regio, eius religio” – when control by the local state authorities determines the rather vigorous quantitative development of the OCU in the north-west of the country. Where there is less willingness to follow the narratives of the struggle for “spiritual independence”, there the situation of traditional and significant quantitative superiority of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church remains. In general, this leads to the fact that the religious policy of recent times contributes to the deepening division of Ukraine, which already traditionally exists according to cultural and geographical criteria. This in no way contributes to strengthening the national security of Ukraine as an integral state.
Here you can see the mentioned table of statistics of parishes and church buildings – https://www.academic-initiative.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/statistics_of_SSEFC.pdf
Here you can see the mentioned map, where Ukraine is divided into two parts – https://www.academic-initiative.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/map_Ukraine_in_two _parts.pdf