



EXPECTATIONS OF THE SOCIETY FROM THE CHURCH AND INTERCHURCH RELATIONS


Since 2000 the Sociological Service of Razumkov Center has been monitoring conditions and trends in religiosity of the the Ukrainian society. The latest national survey was conducted from 23 till 28 March, 2018 with support of Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine. The study was carried out in all regions of Ukraine, except for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 2016 respondents aged 18 and over were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.



Most citizens recognize influence of religion on certain aspects of society’s life. To some extent, assessment of what aspects of social life are affected by religion also reflects respondents’ expectations of religion and church. Thus, 71% of citizens believe the role of religion is to “*strengthen people’s morality and spirituality*” (most often in the West (90%), most rarely – in the East (58%)); 64% consider it “*one of the important ways of reviving national identity and culture*” (most often in the West of the country (82%), least often – in the East (48%)), 52% consider it “*one of the elements of a democratic society*” (most often in the West (70%), most rarely in the East (40%).



Trust to the Church. In terms of trust, the Church retains one of the top positions among social and political institutions (next to volunteer organizations and the armed forces). At the same time compared to 2010, when the level of society’s trust to the Church peaked (73%), now this figure is lower (60%). In the regional dimension, the level of trust correlates to the overall level of religiousness: if in the Western region the Church is trusted by 83% of the respondents (the level of religiosity is here 91%), then in the East it is only 48% (the level of religiosity is here 63%). In all regions, the number of those, who trust to the Church, exceeds the number of those who do not trust it (however, in the East the Church is not trusted by a large part of population – 39%). At the same time, one can draw attention to a rather significant number (23%) of those in the South of the country, who could not decisively answer on this issue.



At the same time high level of trust to the Church is rather a reflection of attitude to religion and its potential role in the society, than a reflection of attitude to the church representatives. Only 19% of respondents are convinced that “*the majority of clerics are deeply moral and spiritual*” (and the amount of those, who support this opinion, has been decreasing – in 2010, they were 26%). Most often, the citizens believe that “*clerics are like most of us with all the same virtues and transgressions*”. At present, 44% of those interviewed support this opinion. 26% consider that “*most clerics think first of all about money, not spirituality*” (in 2010, they were 17%).




The moral authority of the Church. The high level of trust to the Church is in contrast with its recognition as a moral authority. At present, 45% of those interviewed recognize the Church as

moral authority, while in 2010 they were 56%. It is not considered as moral authority by 35% (in comparison to 27% in 2010).

Positions of the citizens on this issue are clearly regionally divided: the Church is a moral authority for 74% of residents in the West, the figures are significantly lower in the Center and the South (41% and 39%, respectively), and, especially, in the East (only 28%). Eastern Region is the only one, where the majority of respondents (52%) state that the Church is not a moral authority for them. In the East, the residents have a low level of trust in the hierarchs of all major churches of Ukraine (including those most represented in this region).

The Church is viewed as a moral authority by 84% of those respondents who attended Church last Sunday before the survey, and only by 33% of those who did not attend it. Obviously, it is recognition or non-recognition of the Church as a moral authority that determines the decision for a person to attend or not to attend Church services.



Only 49% of those interviewed believe that the Church plays a positive role in the modern Ukrainian society. Again, most often the role of the Church as positive is described by the residents in the West (74%), while in the Center it is 45%, in the South 43%, and in the East only 33%.

It is worth noting that **this does not mean negative role of the Church**. So far, only 5% of respondents have estimated it in this way (from 2% in the West to 8% in the East). At the same time, a large group (32%) of those interviewed share the view that “*Church does not play a significant role*” – here the assessment of residents from the Central, Southern and Eastern regions (this assessment is shared by 35%, 37%, 39% residents, respectively) differs significantly from position of people from the Western region (only 15% support this) (diagrams “*What is the role of Church ...?*”).

Most often, the positive role of the Church is noted by the faithful of the UGCC (84%), to a less extent by the faithful of the UOC-KP (63%) and of the UOC (54%), and even less by “mere Christians” (40%) and “mere Orthodox” (35%), and very rarely – by those, who do not follow any of the religious denominations (5%). The latter more often than others consider that Church plays a negative role (21%).

Perhaps, the authority of the Church is not strong enough, because the citizens consider it to be insufficiently active in social life. Thus, the vast majority (74%) of respondents expect that *“religious leaders have to defend the poorest groups of citizens, in case the authorities take decisions that lower people’s standard of living”*. Residents of the West and Centre agree with this statement more often (82% and 77%, respectively), as compared to citizens in the South and East (69% and 65%, respectively).

At the same time, the relative majority of respondents agree that religious organizations play weak role in social work: helping the poor, disabled, sick and elderly, etc. (42% of those interviewed agree with this against 34% of those who disagree). However, it should be noted that the share of those agreeing with this position has decreased, compared to 2000, when it was 52%.

The situation differs significantly by the regions: if in the West, the relative majority (47%) disagree that religious organizations have weak role in social work (only 31% agree with this point of view), then in all other regions the relative majority of those interviewed agree that religious organizations have weak role in the social work.

By the way, the level of trust to the Church is lower among those respondents who agree that religious organizations play weak role in social work, than among those who disagree with this (52% and 76%, respectively).



Assessing, on which side the Church stands regarding “the poor and disadvantaged” vs. “the strong and rich”, citizens are increasingly more inclined to believe that **the Church is in some extent more on the side of “the strong and rich”**: if in 2010, on the ten-point scale (where “1” is “defending the rights of the poor and disadvantaged” and “10” – of “the strong and rich”), the Church’s position was given 5.2 points, then in 2018, it was 5.9 points. The only region with less than 5 points was the West (4.9 points); in the rest of regions – from 5.4 points in the South to 6.6 points in the East of the country.



As previously, most citizens are convinced that “*the Church should not interfere in the relations between a citizen and state authority*”. However, the number of those, who think in this way, decreased from 63% in 2010 to 54% in 2018. Instead, the number of those, who believe that “*depending on the situation, Church should either support or criticize the authorities*” has increased from 10% to 17%. Another 11% of those interviewed believe that “*the Church is obliged to criticize the state authority because its mission is to expose lies and abuse*”. So, more than a quarter (28%) of citizens express demand for critical position of the Church regarding the state authority. Only 6% share the view that “*Church is obliged to support state authority*” because “*there is no authority not to be from God*”.



Ukrainian society generally remains tolerant to practicing different religions. As previously, the majority of citizens believe that “*any religion that proclaims the values of goodness, love, mercy and does not threaten the existence of other people, has the right to exist*” (44%) or “*all religions have the right to exist as different ways to God*” (31%). Compared to 2017, the general amount of those, who chose these two options, remained almost unchanged.

Only 9% of those interviewed supported the statement “*only the religion that I confess is true*”, other 14% were convinced that “*only traditional for our country religions have the right to exist*”.

It is worth to draw attention **to certain dependence of the positions of the respondents on their church-religious self-determination.** Thus, the supporters of the UOC and UGCC are slightly less tolerant to the religious freedom, than the supporters of the UOC-KP, “mere Orthodox”, “mere Christians”, and Ukrainian citizens in general. More than a third of UOC and UGCC (38% and 35%, respectively) supporters believe that only the religion they practice or the religions, traditional for the country, have right to exist (diagram “*Which of the following statements on religion...?*”).


What is your attitude to the following religions and religious movements?, %

	positiv	neutral	negativ	I did not think about it	I did not hear about this religion	No answer
Orthodoxy	78,3	14,7	1,1	5,7	0,1	0,1
Greek Catholicism	41,7	38,7	3,6	15,4	0,5	0,1
Rome Catholicism	36,2	41,6	4,0	17,0	1,0	0,0
Protestantism	19,0	44,7	12,7	20,8	2,6	0,1
Islam	14,1	43,5	18,6	22,3	1,4	0,1
Judaism	13,0	45,1	13,5	25,1	2,8	0,4
Evangelical or charismatic churches	13,0	39,9	16,2	23,6	7,2	0,2
Oriental religions and practices (Buddhism, Yoga etc.)	16,2	41,5	9,9	27,9	4,3	0,2

Citizens' attitude to different religions and religious denominations is mostly either positive or indifferent. Most often, positive attitude was expressed to the Orthodoxy – 78% (from 82% in the Center till 74% in the East). Positive attitude to Greek Catholicism was expressed by 42% of respondents, 39% were indifferent, only 4% were. Regarding all other religions and religious denominations in the country, the overall indifferent attitude prevailed. However it is worth to draw attention that quite a significant number of the respondents, who expressed negative attitude, in particular to Islam (19%), Evangelical and Charismatic churches (16%), Judaism (14%), Protestantism (13%).

Attitude to some religions and religious denominations has **very clear regional differences**. Thus, in the West, the overwhelming majority (74%) of those interviewed showed their positive attitude to Greek Catholicism, while in the rest of the regions, the relative majority of respondents were indifferent to it (from 46% in the Center to 38% in the South). Similar is distribution of the attitude towards Roman Catholicism: a positive attitude was expressed by the majority (61%) of respondents in the West, the relative majority showed their indifferent attitude in the rest of the regions (from 49% in the Center to 39% in the South, tables “*What is your attitude to the following religions and religious denominations?*”).

If the relative majority (48%) of the UOC-KP faithful express their positive attitude to Greek Catholicism, the relative majority (45%) of UOC believers have indifferent attitude to it. The same tendency is also evident towards Roman Catholicism: the relative majority (43%) of UOC-KP believers have a positive attitude, whereas the relative majority (46%) of UOC believers are indifferent.



Assessing the reasons of inter-denominational conflicts, respondents say most often that “*conflicts between Churches are purely political*” – 31% of respondents think in this way (although this figure is significantly lower than in 2017, when 37% considered so); such factors as conflicts over property and real estate, as well as conflicts over church hierarchs’ wish for power, took the second and the third place (28% and 25%, respectively). The level of support for the statement on hierarchs’ ambitions has gone significantly down, compared to 2000 (from 39% in 2000 to 25% in 2018), support for the property statement is slightly higher than it was in 2000 – 28% against 23%, respectively, but lower than the one, recorded in 2010 (35%).

It should be noted that the residents of the Western region mention more often property factors as reason for conflicts, they refer more frequently to political factors in the Southern and Eastern regions, and in the Center — political and property factors, and “power ambitions” of hierarchs are mentioned equally often.

The number of those, who see the reason for inter-church conflicts “*in the national issue*”, draws attention: during the monitoring period, it was not less than 10%, and it reached 18% in 2010. In 2018, this figure was 16%: from 12% in the Center to 20% in the South.

14% of respondents suppose that media foment religious intolerance and inter-church conflicts (diagrams “*Why do conflicts occur in Ukraine ...?*”).

Thus, we can make the following **conclusions**:

Religious and church-denominational issues have in Ukraine distinctly regional character. Traditionally, the Western region has the highest level of religiousness, Southern and Eastern have the lowest. Moreover, in the Southern and Eastern regions, the self-identification of the citizens in

religious sphere is characterized by instability, reflecting the general contradiction of changes in the collective consciousness of these regions.

Most often, the role of religion and the Church is seen by Ukrainian citizens as *“strengthening people’s morality and spirituality”*, serving as *“a way of reviving national identity and culture”*, *“supporting development of a democratic society”*.

Only 49% of those interviewed believe that the Church plays a positive role in the modern Ukrainian society. In addition, the level of recognizing Church as a moral authority is decreasing (especially, in the East).

Perhaps, the authority of the Church is not strong enough, because citizens consider it to be insufficiently active in social life. Assessing, on which side the Church stands regarding “the poor and disadvantaged” vs. “the strong and rich”, citizens are increasingly inclined to believe that the Church is in some extent more on the side of “the strong and rich”.

It can be assumed that it is namely on the basis of the idea of social service and active social position that the Churches of Ukraine can find ways of interaction and compromise.